How to Design Microsoft Graph API Permissions

Microsoft Graph API permission design: the difference between delegated and application, narrowing scope with Sites.Selected and Exchange RBAC, admin consent, certificate management and throttling.
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A Mail.Read application permission granted for a reporting app gives that app the right to read every mailbox in the tenant. If the app’s secret leaks from a configuration file, what leaks isn’t the key to a report but the whole company’s email. Microsoft Graph provides access to users, groups, Teams, SharePoint, Outlook and Intune data through a single API; that’s why permission design is the riskiest decision in an integration. Below you’ll find the difference between delegated and application permissions, the mechanisms for narrowing scope, and a step-by-step design based on the principle of least privilege.

Two permission types: delegated and application

Delegated Application
On whose behalf? The signed-in user The application itself; no user
Effective access Permission ∩ the user’s own rights The whole tenant the permission covers (unless narrowed)
Typical use Interfaces that work with the user’s own data Background services, synchronization, automation
Approval User or administrator (depending on the permission) Always administrator consent

The basic rule: if there’s a user interface, look for a solution with delegated permissions first. Application permissions are granted only for scenarios that really run without a user, and with the narrowest possible scope.

With delegated permissions, effective access is an intersection. Even if the app has Files.Read.All, the user only sees the files they themselves can access. Application permissions have no such brake. The mistake we see most often in the field is a developer adding an application permission during testing “to make it work” and the app going to production like that. If an app registration has both delegated and application permissions, check which one is actually used and remove the unused one.

Mechanisms for narrowing scope

  • SharePoint and OneDrive – Sites.Selected: Gives the app access (read or write) not to all sites but only to sites explicitly authorized by an administrator. It should be preferred for helpdesk or intranet integrations.
  • Exchange Online – limiting application access: Mail and calendar application permissions can be limited to specific mailboxes with Exchange’s role-based access control for applications (RBAC for Applications).
  • Teams – resource-specific consent (RSC): Lets the app receive permissions only in the team or chat where it’s installed.
  • Separating read and write: If .Read is enough, .ReadWrite isn’t granted; .All scopes aren’t used without justification.

Sites.Selected has two steps, and this is often overlooked. Adding the permission to the app registration and granting admin consent doesn’t open access to any site on its own; an authorized administrator must then explicitly grant the app permission for the relevant site (with Graph’s site permissions endpoint or PnP PowerShell). If this step isn’t done, the app gets a 403 error and the developer often asks for Sites.ReadWrite.All to solve the problem. Reject the request. What’s missing isn’t the permission but the site-level authorization.

Design steps

  1. Write down the scenario: Which data does the app use, for what operation and how often; is there a user context?
  2. List the required API calls: For each call, choose the least-privileged permission from the permission table on Microsoft Learn.
  3. Apply narrowing: Sites.Selected, Exchange application scoping or RSC.
  4. Choose the authentication method: A certificate or managed identity; if a secret is unavoidable, short-lived and in a vault.
  5. Keep a permission register: App, owner, permission, justification, approver, date and annual review date.
  6. Base admin consent on this register.

In the second step, the “Permissions” section of each endpoint page in the Graph documentation is decisive; this table lists permissions from least privileged to broadest. Picking the permission at the bottom of the list is easy, but it has no justification. Ask the developer requesting admin consent for this list of calls. No list, no consent.

Example: a helpdesk integration

The background service of a Microsoft 365 helpdesk system needs to read the requester’s manager, write to the ticket list in the relevant SharePoint site and send notifications to a Teams channel. The least-privileged design: a basic profile read permission for user and manager information, Sites.Selected write access to the helpdesk site only for SharePoint, and Teams Workflows or a channel-scoped permission for notifications. There’s no need for broad permissions such as “Sites.ReadWrite.All” or “Directory.ReadWrite.All”.

The practical benefit of this design is that damage stays limited in a leak scenario. Even if the service’s credentials are compromised, the attacker can only write to the helpdesk site and read user profiles; they can’t access email, other sites or directory changes. The blast radius shrinks.

Operations and security

  • Certificate and secret expiry dates are monitored; the renewal procedure is written down.
  • App registrations and permissions are reviewed annually; unused apps are removed.
  • App sign-ins and Graph activity are monitored in Entra ID logs.
  • Conditional access policies are considered if they can be applied to workload identities (license-dependent).
  • For throttling, retries that respect Retry-After, batch requests and delta queries are used.

An expired certificate is the most common reason integrations quietly stop in the morning. Report expiry dates regularly from the app registrations in Entra ID and plan renewals at least a few weeks in advance; the old and new certificates can stay defined together for a while, which allows a seamless switchover. At least two people, not one, should be defined as owners of the app. An app registration whose owner has left is an identity nobody takes responsibility for. Restricting users from consenting to apps on their own at tenant level and enabling the admin consent workflow prevents shadow integrations.

Frequently asked questions

Does an app granted an application permission access the whole tenant?

By default, yes; for example, the Mail.Read application permission covers all mailboxes. That’s why narrowing mechanisms such as application access scoping for Exchange and Sites.Selected for SharePoint should be used.

Client secret or certificate?

Certificate-based authentication, or managed identity for services running in Azure, should be preferred. If a secret is used, it should be short-lived, stored in a secure vault and its expiry date monitored.

Why are Graph API calls returning 429 errors?

Graph applies request limits per service (throttling). The Retry-After period in the 429 response should be respected, bulk operations done with batch requests, and delta queries or change notifications used to track changes.

Since permission names and behaviors can be updated over time, the current permission reference on Microsoft Learn should be checked before implementation. To build your integration with a secure permission model, see our Microsoft Graph API integrations service.

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